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CULTURAL
ECONOMICS OF ARTS FUNDING:
Five Variations on a Theme
Harry
Hillman Chartrand ©
Introduction,
Paying for the Arts, W. S. Hendon, H.H. Chartrand, H. Horowitz
(eds)
Association for Cultural Economics, University of Akron, 1987
Preface
In
this book 26 authors from 11 countries - Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland,
Hungary, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America - present 25 research papers concerning different
aspects of arts funding. All papers, except this introduction, were
prepared for presentation at the 4th International Conference on Cultural
Economics and Planning held at Avignon, in the south of France, in May 1986.
Before
exploring the range of experience and opinion reflected in these articles, it is
appropriate to create a context for considering arts funding in differing
national cultures and traditions. Five variations will be presented on the
general theme that the changing role and status of the arts reflects general
social evolution. The five variations are: Culture and Art; Culture and
Economy; Art and Law; Art and Economy; and Politics and Arts Funding.
Culture
& Art
The
evolution of culture has been characterized by the progressive division of
labour and differentiation of social function from a state of
non-differentiation in pre-literate communities to higher and higher orders of
differentiation. Today, contemporary culture can be defined as greater
than the sum of various differentiated sub-cultures including the arts, crafts,
economics, fashion, heritage, language, law, multiculturalism, politics,
religion, science, and sports. Within the arts there has been a parallel
development characterized by the progressive "individualization" of
the artist from anonymity to celebrity.
In
traditional societies, awe and mystery surround the created object into which
the creator projects spirit and soul. In Japan, for example, reflecting an
ancient tradition of animism, a sword, being a product of mental work, is
regarded not merely as a material object, but as imbued with the author's living
spirit. Furthermore, objects of worship are not limited to visible and
concrete things. Even a word can have a spirit (Koisumi 1977). In
the Occident, only vague hints of ancient animism remain in concepts such as
"the moral rights" of creators.
The
"numinosity" (Jung 1964) of artifacts among pre-literate peoples
reflects an investment of what Carl Sagan calls "extra-somatic"
knowledge, i.e. knowlege carried outside of the body (Sagan 1977). Such
knowledge can, by analogy, be considered the social genetic which directs the
evolution of human society. It is the knowledge passed from one generation
to another. Today it is embodied in books, recordings, computer software,
and other contemporary ways to transmit "know-how" to future
generations.
In
pre-literate societies, such knowledge is transmitted orally through the
mnemonics of ritual and chant enforced through religious practice and
taboo. The association of rhythmic or repetitively patterned utterances
with supernatural knowledge endures well into historical times. Among the
early Arabic peoples, for example, the word for poet was sha'ir, "the
knower", a person endowed with knowledge by the spirits (Jaynes 1978).
In
such societies, innovation depends upon the insight of the creator and his or
her ability to insure the integrity of mnemonic instruction, whether in the form
of incantation or epic poem. Cause and effect are not
distinguishable. It is through the unchanging enactment of ritual that
desired results are achieved. Science and art are one. How to make
something and the thing made are mystically unified. Process and product
are identical. To name a thing is to magically control it.
In
fact, the distinction between economy and culture does not exist in such
societies. To the Balinese, for example, artistic knowledge is not
restricted to a special intellectual class. In fact, the Balinese have no
words for art or artist. Making a beautiful offering, carving a temple
gate, or playing a musical instrument, all are tasks of equal aesthetic
importance produced anonymously, and done entirely in the service of society and
religion with no thought of personal gain (Morris 1982).
How
different the case has become in contemporary Western Civilization. In the
Ancient World and during the Middle Ages, the identity of the artist was seldom
known. The great cathedrals were built anonymously by artist engineers who
combined the mystical arts and sciences of the guilds. In the Renaissance,
the scientist and artist were still one and the same person, but personal
identity became attached to the works of the proverbial Renaissance Man.
Beginning,
however, with the Enlightenment and Republican Revolutions of the 18th and the
Industrial Revolution of the 19th centuries, a divergence appeared between
scientific and artistic ways of knowing. The Romantics, followed by the
"Art for Art's Sake Movement" consciously and deliberately separated
the arts from an increasingly industrialized, "de- humanized" society
(Henderson 1984: 46). This led the high arts and the artist to become
increasingly isolated from mainstream society (Bell 1976: 13-14).
Within
mainstream society, the scientific, utilitarian ethic triumphed in the late 19th
and 20th centuries. The anonymous and ubiquitous industrial
"object" displaced the individualized, hand-made,
"subjective" work of art. In the Communist world, this was
called "socialist realism". In the Capitalist world it was
called Bauhaus and the international style of architecture.
During
this period the increasingly obscure aesthetics of high art, in which the label
is the art work (Wolfe 1975), became more and more alien to the average citizen.
In the high arts today, the artist has become the "art object" in new
high arts disciplines such as "performance art" (Hughes 1981).
In the commercial arts, the "identity" of the artist serves as the
basis for emerging and controversial "celebrity rights" which require
payment to the artist, or descendants, for the right to imitate the artist's
mannerisms or appearance for commercial purposes. There remains today,
however, a fundamental dissonance between artistic and scientific ways of
knowing. To some, this dissonance is a threat to the long-term well-being
of Western societies (Harman 1979).
Culture
& Economy
In
social evolution, economics, as a discipline of thought, emerged in the late
18th century (Smith 1776). The founding father of economics, Adam Smith,
had a strong sense of the cultural matrix of economic phenomena. By the
mid- to late 19th century, however, economics had split into two opposing camps
based, at least in part, on conflicting views of the impact of culture, or stage
of cultural development, on economic behaviour. The intensity of this
schism between the reformed church of "the science of political
economy" called Marxism, and the orthodox church of "Market
Economics" is potentially as appocalyptic as the Religious Wars of 15th and
16th century Europe which gave birth to the "secular" sciences,
including economics. The schism also caused political economics to fission
into sociology, political science and what can be called Market Economics.
This partially contributed to mainstream economics in the West losing its
original sense of culture and becoming an abstract discipline pretending to be
unaffected by culture (Boulding 1972: 267).
Not
all schools of Western economic thought lost sight of the role of culture.
One school which maintained a linkage with culture was Institutional Economics.
It includes the work of American economists John R. Commons, Thorstein Veblen,
Wesley Mitchell, and Clarence Ayres, and the work of European economists Max
Weber, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and especially Joseph Schumpeter whose work
stressed the influence of class, technological change and institutional setting
on economic behaviour (Schumpeter 1942). To Institutionalists, economic
behaviour is subject to the cultural and legal context of a given country and
specific period of history (Commons 1926, 1934).
Legal
and cultural relativism is also part of the legacy of Canadian economist Harold
Innis, particularly in his work on the impact of transportation (Innis 1956) and
communications technologies on the economy (Innis 1950, 1951). He
recognized that all scholarship must be grounded in analysis of the radical
particularities of time and place, history and geography. The general
takes form and meaning only in the context of the specific. However, in
Innis' time mainstream economists adopted 19th century natural science models
and suggested they expounded, like physical scientists, laws that were
universal, that held without regard to time, place and circumstance (Carey 1981:
79). Given 20th century developments in physics concerning the role of
relativity, uncertainty and the "wave/particle" paradox of light,
Innis knew that mainstream economics must grow beyond 19th century scientific
models.
Through
his study of communications media, Innis identified a fundamental relationship
between culture and communications media. A culture is restricted in
space, but extensive in time, i.e. it has duration, to the extent its dominant
communications medium is durable, e.g. stone, clay or parchment.
Alternatively, a culture is extensive in space, but restricted in time, to the
extent its dominant communications medium is non-durable but easily transported,
e.g. papyrus and paper. Using this hypothesis Innis attempted to explain
the rise and fall of empires through history. In fact, one of Innis'
colleagues, Marshall McLuhan, took this relativism, first to "the medium is
the message", and then to human consciousness being fundamentally altered
by the emergence of new electronic communication media (McLuhan 1978).
Three examples demonstrate Innisian analysis.
First,
acidic paper has been used for more than 100 years. Books, newspapers,
periodicals and other written records fixed in this medium are now
disintegrating in libraries and archives around the world (The Economist,
February 27, 1987: B-1). From an Innisian perspective, this implies that
European expansion and colonization of the last century would be short-lived
because the dominant communications medium was cheap and easily
transportable. In fact, the second British "Empire on which the Sun
never sets", was, in historical terms, one of the most extensive in space,
but shortest in duration of any major historical empire.
Second,
the dominant communications medium today is television which spans the world in
an instant, i.e. it is extensive in space. Television takes the average
citizen around the world to spaces and places of which his ancestors never
heard. A question, however, has arisen concerning television's impact on
attention span. Some argue that children do not read because their
attention span has been reduced by commercial television, i.e. the medium, while
extensive in space, affects the psychological duration of time.
Third,
new communications technologies, such as video recording, have made the arts, or
the entertainment industry, the largest sector of final demand in the emerging
"information economy" (Porat 1977). These communications media
are unusual in terms of Innis' dichotomy between durability and
transportability. First, the new media hardware including direct broadcast
satellites, fibre optics, magnetic recording technologies, and the compact disc
player are based upon silicon and iron oxide, i.e. stone, which will endure for
more than a century. Production of consumer "home entertainment"
hardware is dominated by the Japanese. Second, the messages conveyed
through these technologies are as ephemeral as a ray of sunshine, but cross the
globe in the twinkling of an eye. Programming software production is
dominated by the American entertainment industry. This combination of
Innisian characteristics and the division of labour with respect to production
of the medium and message suggests the emergence of a new culture unlike any in
human history. Like previous communications revolutions, the emergence of
a new communications medium is being accompanied by a breakdown of old ways of
communicating, and by a heightened sense of societal "dis-ease".
The
impact of the Institutionalist tradition has contributed to a contemporary split
between what can be called cultural economics and the economics of
culture. Both are reported in articles contained in this book and in the
Journal of Cultural Economics. Both are necessary for a complete economic
appreciation of reality. Cultural economics is the study of the evolutionary
influence of cultural differences on economic thought and behaviour.
Accordingly, cultural economics assumes economic behaviour varies according to
cultural context. The seminal and leading exponent of transdisciplinary,
relativistic cultural economics is Kenneth Boulding (Boulding 1972). The
economics of culture, on the other hand, is the study of the allocation of
scarce resources within the cultural sector. It assumes objective laws
apply to economic behaviour without regard to cultural differences. It
places emphasis on the "scientific" or absolute nature of economics
and application of abstract mathematical technique. The seminal and
leading exponent of the positivist economics of culture is William Baumol (Baumol,
Bowen 1966).
Art
& Law
Law
emerged earlier in social evolution than economics. Among other things,
law permits or prohibits economic activity, e.g. anti- trust or combines
legislation, resale price maintenance, predatory pricing practices,
insider-dealing, etc. Law creates markets where none previously existed,
e.g. intellectual property legislation. It has, however, been only in the
last generation that economic and social science research has been admitted as
evidence and deemed relevant in courts of law (Mayer 1978).
Law is rooted in the unique history and experience of a community. There
exist distinct American, English, and European legal cultures which permit or
prohibit different kinds of economic behaviour. With respect to the arts,
many types of law and legislation of a statutory, regulatory, and criminal
nature affect economic behaviour. These include censorship, broadcasting
and cable television licencing, and copyright.
The most important law affecting art and economy is copyright. Like other
forms of law, its nature and impact on economic behaviour varies according to
national experience. Copyright and other forms of intellectual property
legislation are justified as a protection of, and incentive to, human creativity
which otherwise could be used freely by others. In return, the State
expects creators to make their work available to society as a whole, and that a
market will be created in which such work can be bought and sold. But
while the State wishes to encourage creativity, it does not want to foster
harmful market power. Accordingly, the State builds in limitations to the
rights granted to the creator. Such limitations embrace both time and
space. Rights are granted for a fixed period of time, and protect only the
fixation of human creativity in material form (Chartrand March 1985).
An
extreme example will illustrate the role of copyright in Western economies.
Consider a literary work which becomes a play through the licence or sale of
copyright. In turn, the play becomes a film which, in turn, is spun-off
into posters, toys and a soundtrack. Both the film and soundtrack are
broadcast on radio and television. Eventually a book is made concerning
the making of the movie, and a sequel of the movie is then produced. Even
museums and archives are related to copyright in that most artifacts and
documents, contained therein, are within the public domain, i.e. copyright has
lapsed through time (Chartrand January 1987). It is through the
exploitation of the revenue streams implicit in the grant of copyright that the
commercialization of the arts is possible.
In
French-speaking and most Western European countries, "droits d'auteur"
or "author's rights" are the core, of what in English-speaking
countries, is called copyright. Such rights are rooted in the Republican
Revolutions of the late 18th century, and the "Rights of Man
Movement". Following the Communist Revolutions of the 20th century,
the case in the Communist Bloc is similar yet different from that in Western
Europe. While the moral rights of the creator are recognized through a one
time award, all subsequent rights revert to the State.
Moral
rights are not, however, the historical root of copyright in the
English-speaking world. Rather, in the 15th century with the introduction
of the printing press, Tudor monarchs began to grant to approved printers the
right to copy approved works, i.e. copyright. Thus the roots of copyright
are censorship and feudal grants of commercial privilege (MacDonald 1971: 14-
16). These residuals of feudal and crown law did not vanish with the
advent of democracy. On the contrary, they survived in attenuated form to
plague democratic law and government. Obsolete in practice, they still
influence "the spirit of the law" (Gray 1981: 108).
In
English-speaking countries, therefore, copyright is traditionally the legal
foundation of industrial organization of the arts. In European countries,
"author's rights" are traditionally intended as a reward for
creativity, and royalties probably play a more significant role in the economic
status of the artist than in the English-speaking world. The question
does, however, require further research.
Emphasis in copyright on fixation in material form highlights the relationship
between Innisian analysis and Carl Sagan's "extra-somatic"
knowledge. In pre-literate societies it was the mnemonics of rite and
ritual that encoded extra-somatic knowledge in oral communications media.
The ability to record such knowledge and maintain its integrity in the modern
world is a function of technological change in communications hardware and
enforcement of an abstract form of property rights called copyright.
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